When a rm has external debt and monitoring by shareholders is essential, managerial bonuses are shown to be an optimal solution. A small managerial bonus linked to rm's performance not only reduces moral hazard between managers and shareholders, but also between creditors and monitoring shareholders. A negative relation between corporate bond yields and managerial bonuses can be predicted. Furthermore, the model shows how higher managerial pay-performance sensitivity goes hand in hand with greater company leverage and lower company diversi cation. These predictions nd some support in the empirical literature.
Introduction
In modern companies managers and shareholders together strive to enhance rm's value; they are, however, in competition when sharing the rm's revenues, not only internally, but also with outside investors (as pointed out by Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Designing the optimal managerial compensation has to account for this doubleedged competition. While managerial compensation improves managerial e ort, it also reduces the amount of resources available to repay shareholders for their monitoring and bondholders for their investment in the rm. The impact of greater managerial compensation on company value crucially depends on the e ect on all parties' incentives.
The interplay between managerial compensation and the nancial structure of a rm is not new in literature (see Murphy,1999 , for a review). We depart from such literature by explicitly introducing shareholders' monitoring for at least two reasons.
First, shareholders' monitoring is as important as managerial e ort to improve company value: for instance Core et al. (1999) nd evidence that governance structures with greater control on managers improve company performance, while Huson et al. (2001) show that monitoring by shareholders increases the rate of replacement of managers in response to a poor company perfomance. Second, although managerial e ort is essential, the empirical evidence on managerial compensation is controversial:
for example Jensen and Murphy (1990) document that CEO pay-performance sensitivity is only 3.25$ per 1000$ change in shareholder value. This evidence questions the e ectiveness of monetary incentives alone, without shareholders' monitoring, to enhance managerial e ort.
In the model, managers strive to put in the essential e ort but are subject to moral hazard: monetary incentives and shareholders' monitoring motivate their e ort.
Given that monitoring is unobservable, there is an additional moral hazard between shareholders and bondholders. In a leveraged rm, this moral hazard curtails insiders e ort. Our ndings show that shareholders in leveraged rms might nd it optimal to pay a bonus to their managers in order to show bondholders a greater commitment towards monitoring. The direct e ect of a larger managerial bonus is to increase the e ort of the manager. However, when exerting greater e ort, the manager reduces the likelihood of company bankruptcy; as a result, the incentive for shareholders to monitor increases in that they are residual claimants of any bene t from monitoring when the rm is solvent. Even a small managerial bonus helps to restore correct incentives for insiders, creating a virtuous circle, reducing the cost of external debt and enhancing total company value. This bene t is greater in leveraged and undiversi ed rms.
The implications of the model nd empirical support in Duru et al.(2005) concerning the relation between managerial bonuses, corporate bond yields and leverage and in Rose and Shepard (1997) documenting a reduction in the managerial compensation as a consequence of increased corporate diversi cation.
The research outlined in this paper relates to the literature on managerial compensation and nancial structure of the rm (John and John, 1993; Calcagno and Renneboog, 2006; Berkovitz et al., 2000) . There the focus is on asset substitution efforts of insiders, while here the focus is on the monitoring e ort of the owner. This has di erent implications for optimal managerial compensation. In the literature investigating asset substitution, shareholders and managers' interests are aligned through an increase in the pay-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation, by means of bonuses or stock-holdings. In a leveraged rm, greater pay-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation increases the cost of debt since bondholders anticipate the increased asset substitution attitude of managers; thus pay-performance sensitivity decreases with the level of debt. Here, instead, it is shown that a greater sensitivity to company revenues improves not only managerial e ort, but -most importantlyshareholders' monitoring, reinforcing insiders' incentives to exert extra e ort. This has a positive consequence on the cost of debt. While a managerial bonus alone introduces a problem of competition for scarce resources between company insiders and outsiders, shareholders' monitoring helps to mitigate this competition.
The idea of e ciency wages (see Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984 , and subsequent papers) is here applied to managerial compensation schemes: managers' moral hazard is curbed through monetary incentives, but in addition shareholders monitor and punish their managers when any shirking is detected. This paper underlines the importance of insiders' monitoring as in the literature on shareholders' monitoring (see for instance Huddart, 1993; Aghion and Tirole, 1997; and Burkart et al., 1997). Although we share the opinion expressed in the literature that the e orts of shareholders and managers are both essential for the project, we di er in that we believe that the e orts are complementary, and we thus focus on the case of under-provision of monitoring.
Finally we share some insights with the literature on nancial structure as incentive mechanism (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994) , and on debt as an optimal incentive mechanism when insiders exert unobservable e ort (Innes, 1990; and Cerasi and Daltung, 2000) . In this paper, we add the interaction between managerial e ort and the e orts of the owners.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the basic model, Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium e orts and debt rate, and Section 4 presents optimal managerial compensation. Section 5 extends the basic model. The empirical predictions of the model are contained in Section 6, and concluding remarks are found in Section 7.
The basic model
Consider a two-date economy (T = 0; 1) with three types of agents: entrepreneurs, investors and managers. An entrepreneur, without capital, starts up a risky project.
Investors have capital to invest. A manager can enhance the success of the risky project. The entrepreneur hires the manager to run the project and raises funds from investors.
There are risky projects in the economy. Each project requires 1 unit of capital at date 0 and returns R with probability p at date 1: Project returns are i.i.d. The success probability of each project depends on the combined e orts of the manager and the entrepreneur. We start by focusing on a single project rm and leave to Sub-section 5.2 the discussion of the role of diversi cation in the case of two projects.
The manager exerts an e ort e 2 [0; 1] at a private cost. A moral hazard is present in that the entrepreneur cannot observe the behavior of the manager without costs. The entrepreneur has access to a monitoring technology: by monitoring with intensity m 2 [0; 1], he detects with probability m misbehavior by his manager.
The two e orts, monitoring and managerial e ort, are costly and cannot be observed outside the rm: the monitoring e ort costs The combined impact of the e ort of the manager and of the monitoring of the entrepreneur is captured by the probability of success of the project. Managerial e ort and monitoring e ort are perfect substitutes and impact equally on the probability of success of the project: the probability reaches its maximum, p H ; when either the manager or the entrepreneur exert maximum e ort on the project, and its minimum, p L < p H , when both e ort levels are zero. The speci c form of the probability derives from the outcome of the strategic interaction of the manager and of the entrepreneur, as it will become clear in the following Sub-section.
Without any e ort, the expected return of the risky project is lower than the gross return from an alternative value preserving safe investment, i.e.,
However, when either of the two agents exert maximum e ort, the project return, net of the cost of e ort, is greater than the alternative return:
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of date 0; the entrepreneur sets the managerial compensation for the manager. Then the entrepreneur raises funds from perfectly competitive capital markets and entrepreneur and manager choose, respectively, monitoring e ort m and managerial e ort e. E ort choices are not observable, while returns from the projects are observable to outsiders. At date 1 project returns are realized and claims are settled. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the model.
Insert Figure 1 With this timing we assume that investors observe the managerial compensation.
This assumption is common to other papers, as for instance in John and John (1993) , and derives from the fact that public rms in the U.S. are obliged by the SEC to disclose compensation paid to managers.
The model is solved backwards: equilibrium e ort, monitoring and return to investors are computed for given managerial compensation. Then, entrepreneur's optimal choice of managerial compensation is resolved.
Managerial compensation
The manager, who responds to monetary incentives, is o ered a managerial compensation. The managerial compensation is the sum of a xed salary and a managerial bonus. The xed salary is set at equal to the zero outside option of the manager. The managerial bonus b 2 [0; R] is by contract dependent on the observable return from the project and it is paid whenever the project succeeds. The entrepreneur retains the option to re the manager, when, as a result of monitoring, he detects misbehavior by the manager. 1 The project's probability of success is p H when the old manager is red and a new manager is hired. Figure 2 depicts the strategic interaction of the entrepreneur and of the manager.
Insert Figure 2 From Figure 2 we derive the form of the probability of success of the project:
The probability of success is p H when either the manager or the entrepreneur exert e ort, or when, as a result of monitoring, the manager is red and another one is hired in his place; the probability is p L when the manager shirks without being detected.
Once simpli ed, the probability of success becomes
with Figure 2 depicts the gross return for the entrepreneur and the manager, given their choices of e ort. For given managerial compensation, the utility of the manager is
where q = e p H + (1 e)(1 m)p L is the probability that the manager is rewarded the bonus. The manager chooses to exert e ort with intensity e : when he performs successfully, he earns the managerial bonus with probability p H ; otherwise with probability p L : However, when he shirks his duties and the entrepreneur detects him, he is red with probability m(1 e), and he is not paid the bonus. Notice that the probability of pocketing the managerial bonus is lower compared to the probability of success for the project, that is q = p m(1 e) p H < p: The reason is that, although the project might succeed, the manager will not earn the managerial bonus if caught shirking. However the new manager is paid the same bonus as the old manager. 
Financing of the rm
To start a project, an entrepreneur with ! units of inside equity issues D = 1 ! units of debt on perfectly competitive nancial markets. For each unit, the debt claim promises to pay a face value r on date 1. Given the random return from the project net of the managerial bonus Z, the expected pro t of the entrepreneur (the owner or the main shareholder of the rm) can be expressed as
where the rst term represents the expected total returns from the projects net of managerial bonus and after debt-holders have been repaid, the second term is the opportunity cost of entrepreneur's capital and the third term is the monitoring cost.
Expression (3) shows that debt carries a bankruptcy risk. Since the entrepreneur is subject to limited liability but invests in a risky project, debt-holders may not obtain the promised face value. We can rewrite eq.(3) as
where [r S]D = rD E max frD Z; 0g is the expected return to debt-holders, the di erence between the debt rate r and the expected shortfalls on the face value of debt S = (1 p)r. The expected shortfalls vary with monitoring and managerial e ort in line with the probability of success of projects: greater monitoring and managerial e ort lead to greater probability of honoring the debt and smaller expected shortfalls.
3 Equilibrium e orts and debt rate
We now turn to the equilibrium e ort choices, monitoring and managerial e ort, and to the equilibrium debt rate, for a given managerial bonus b.
The entrepreneur and the manager choose simultaneously and non-cooperatively their e orts; then investors, anticipating the equilibrium e orts, set the debt rate accordingly. We characterize the symmetric equilibrium of the game in the following Proposition: 
where
Proof. See the appendix.
Eq. (5) shows that the e ort of the manager increases when either the managerial bonus or monitoring increases; in other words, the managerial bonus and monitoring are substitutes to induce higher managerial e ort.
Eq. (6) shows the moral hazard between the entrepreneur and investors. The moral hazard of external nancing is captured by the negative sign of the second term, i.e., the derivative of the expected shortfalls with respect to monitoring: as the monitoring e ort increases, the probability of success rises and this reduces the expected shortfalls. The marginal bene t of monitoring is partially appropriated by investors through a reduction in the expected shortfalls. Given that investors cannot observe the monitoring intensity, the debt rate will not be adjusted accordingly and this reduces the monitoring e ort of the entrepreneur. The severity of this moral hazard depends on the size of expected shortfalls: expected shortfalls are reduced by increases in either managerial e ort or entrepreneurial monitoring.
Finally, eq. (7) shows that in equilibrium the expected return from risky debt must equal the alternative return 1.
Once we substitute the symmetric equilibrium e orts, monitoring and debt rate in eq. (4), the entrepreneur's pro ts are:
We now turn to the optimal managerial compensation.
Optimal managerial compensation
In the rst stage, the entrepreneur, who anticipates e ort choices and debt rate, sets the level of the managerial bonus to maximize his pro ts in eq. (8) . The entrepreneur nds it optimal to pay a managerial bonus whenever equilibrium pro ts increase with the bonus. We compare equilibrium pro ts without a bonus b (0) to equilibrium pro ts in (8) and derive:
The di erence in pro ts depends upon three components: the di erence in success probabilities, the direct impact of the bonus on total revenues and the di erence in monitoring costs. Given that the managerial bonus has a direct negative e ect on pro ts, a necessary condition for its optimality is that it has a positive impact on the probability of success. We have the following result. Proof. See the appendix.
Given the di culty to nd a closed-form solution for the equilibrium equations in (5)- (7) due to non-linearities, we use a numerical example to show cases in which pro ts might be higher with a managerial bonus than without it. Let us take a speci c numerical example where the project is entirely nanced through debt. We Investors, anticipating that with the bonus the manager exerts a higher e ort and that a smaller probability of default of the project increases the monitoring e ort of the entrepreneur, demand a lower interest rate. This reduces the cost of the external nance and rises overall pro ts. The bonus serves as an optimal commitment to increase the monitoring e ort of the entrepreneur. The crucial assumption for the result is that investors observe managerial compensation. The result in this paper o ers an additional rationale for why this is bene cial for rms demanding external nance.
Leverage and diversi cation
The model shows the optimality of managerial bonuses as a way for the entrepreneur to commit to a higher level of monitoring level. This result depends on leverage and diversi cation.
Greater leverage
The optimal managerial bonus depends on the level of debt over total assets, i.e., the rm's leverage. Proposition 2 shows that the bene t of the managerial bonus may be important enough to achieve greater probability of success than without the managerial bonus. To see when this result occurs, we conduct some comparative statistics.
Proposition 3
The threshold m 2 (0; 1) decreases with the amount of debt D:
As the level of debt increases, the problem of the moral hazard of the entrepreneur becomes more acute; at the equilibrium the level of monitoring decreases. This reduces equilibrium pro ts. An increase in the managerial bonus increases the managerial e ort and thus ameliorates the moral hazard of the entrepreneur. This reduces the cost of the external nance and increases the equilibrium pro ts. Figure 3 shows the entrepreneur's equilibrium monitoring e ort, while Figure 4 entrepreneur's equilibrium pro ts, as functions of the managerial bonus for di erent levels of debt, D = 0 and D = 1.
Insert Figure 3 and Figure 4 The optimal managerial bonus is larger in rms with greater leverage. Conversely, the smaller the inside equity the greater the moral hazard of the entrepreneur: to induce monitoring the entrepreneur must pay managers a greater managerial bonus.
Given that the managerial bonus is observable to investors, this implies a greater commitment to monitoring by the entrepreneur.
Larger number of projects
The optimal managerial bonus depends on the number of independent projects D +!:
We extend the basic model to the case of 2 projects to see how the result on the optimality of the managerial bonus changes with greater diversi cation.
3
To start 2 projects, an entrepreneur with ! units of inside equity issues D = 2 ! units of debt on perfectly competitive markets. 4 As before, for each unit, the debt claim promises to pay a face value r on date 1: The entrepreneur assignes each project to a di erent manager. The distribution of total returns from projects now is di erent from the model with a single project as the revenues come from the sum of two independent projects. Given total returns from projects, net of managerial bonus payments, Z; the expected pro t of the entrepreneur can be expressed as
where the rst term represents the expected total returns from the 2 projects net of the managerial bonus, the second term is the expected return to debt-holders, the third term is the opportunity cost of entrepreneur's capital and the last term is the sum of monitoring costs. The expected return to debt-holders is the di erence between the debt rate r and the expected shortfalls on the face value of debt S:
Similarly to the single project case, the symmetric equilibrium of the game is In the following Proposition we show how the monitoring e ort changes when the entrepreneur increases the number of projects, switching from a single project to two projects, for a given leverage.
Proposition 4 For a given leverage, the threshold m 2 (0; 1) increases with the number of projects.
more or less correlated opportunities. See for instance Hellwig (1998) for a model where this choice is analyzed in a setting without delegation.
For a given leverage, as the number of independent projects increases from 1 to 2 the optimal managerial bonus decreases. For instance in the same numerical example as that in Section 4, for the entrepreneur starting 2 projects instead of one project, the optimal bonus is 0:05 whereas it was 0:06 in the single project case. Notice that the entrepreneur has to issue 1 unit more of debt to fund the additional project:
however the increased diversi cation reduces the moral hazard of the entrepreneur.
Given that the number of projects is observable by investors before signing the debt contract, increasing the number of projects has a commitment e ect on the entrepreneur's monitoring. From eq. (6) the moral hazard of the entrepreneur depends on the size of the expected shortfalls on debt. As the number of independent projects increases, expected shortfalls and their derivative reduce. 5 The derivative captures the moral hazard of the entrepreneur and decreases with the number of independent projects: in a diversi ed rm it will be very small. As the size of the rm increases, the incentive to monitor by the entrepreneur is stronger even without a managerial bonus. This mechanism is analyzed in Cerasi and Daltung (2000) , where it is shown that, when the degree of diversi cation reduces variability in the distribution of project returns, lessening the probability of failure of the rm increases the incentive to monitor of the entrepreneur. Managerial bonuses and diversi cation are thus substitute mechanisms to strengthen insiders' incentives.
Empirical implications
The model has numerous empirical predictions on the level of managerial compensation. This paper shares with many others (e.g., John and John, 1993 ) the implication that managerial compensation and nancial structure of the rm are to be studied together. This implication nds empirical support in Hartzell and Starcks (2003) .
The model predicts that, once we control for the degree of diversi cation and leverage, rms paying higher managerial bonus to their managers have a lower cost of external debt. Evidence of a negative cross-sectional relation between managerial bonus and returns to bondholders is supportive of our model. Duru et al. (2005) nd that larger managerial bonuses are associated with lower corporate bond yields and 5 The property that expected shortfalls are smaller in the case of two projects is due to the Binomial distribution of total returns. In a more general case, according to the law of large numbers, it is possible to nd a number of projects su ciently large for the expected shortfalls to decrease.
conclude that managerial bonuses help reduce the cost of external debt in contrast with the empirical evidence on the relation between managerial stock-holdings and bond yields (see, for instance, De Fusco et al., 1990, among others) .
Another prediction of the model is that, once controls are set for rm size or degree of diversi cation, the higher the leverage, the greater the level of managerial bonus:
as the acuteness of moral hazard increases, insiders shift the greater risk of default onto creditors due to limited liability. A greater managerial bonus serves to increase insiders' incentives. There is empirical evidence that more leveraged rms pay higher leverage is accompanied by the adoption of greater pay-performance incentives for managers (see Kaplan, 1989 ).
Finally, a prediction of the model is that more diversi ed rms should pay lower managerial bonuses, given that managerial bonuses and a higher degree of diversi cation are alternative mechanisms to improve insiders' incentives. Jensen and Murphy (1990) report empirical evidence that in larger rms the average sensitivity of managerial compensation to change in shareholders wealth is 1.85$ compared with the gure of 8.05$ in smaller rms. This prediction is in line with this evidence, when larger rms are also more diversi ed: Rose and Shepard (1997) show that changes in incumbent CEO compensation levels are negatively correlated with changes in the degree of corporate diversi cation.
Conclusion and extensions
This paper analyses the optimal level of managerial bonus when rms are leveraged and non-diversi ed. When monitoring by shareholders is essential, although subject to moral hazard, managerial bonus provides a commitment to exert greater e ort by insiders towards external claim-holders. The model predicts greater managerial pay-performance sensitivity, the greater the leverage and the lower the degree of diversi cation.
Throughout the analysis we have assumed that managers are paid out of project revenues before bondholders, namely that they are senior compared to other creditors.
In the model with a single project this assumption is neutral, while it is crucial for the model with two projects. One possible e ect of a di erent seniority of managerial bonuses is that managers could be punished not only when shirking, but also when the rm is unable to repay bondholders (see for instance John and John, 1993; and Calcagno and Renneboog, 2006) . The optimal priority of claims structure is out of the scope of this paper and requires further investigation.
In the model with 2 projects we have assumed that each manager is assigned to a single risky project. Laux (2001) shows that assigning more than one project to each manager could be optimal, because it increases the set of states in which the entrepreneur can punish the manager. The interaction between internal hierarchy and managerial compensation is left to future research.
Finally, in this paper we have focused on managerial bonuses while ignoring other forms of pay-performance incentives, such as stock-options or direct stock-holdings to managers. Given our simple setup, where each manager is assigned to only one project and project returns are dichotomic, our bonus variable can be easily re-interpreted as managerial equity holdings. In a more general setup, we would have to distinguish between the di erent forms of managerial pay-performance compensation.
A Pro ts with 2 projects
Total return on projects, net of managerial bonus payments, Z; has the Binomial distribution
where p i is given by (1), i 2 f1; 2g and i 6 = i. The expected pro t is
This can be rewritten using the transformation max f0; xg = x + max f0; xg as
This expression simpli es to (10) once we substitute (11) and [r S]D = rD E max frD Z; 0g, where S is given by
For a given managerial bonus b, face value r and managerial e ort e i the entrepreneur chooses the monitoring intensity to maximize pro ts in (10) , that is
with
For a given managerial bonus b; debt rate r and monitoring intensity m i ; each manager chooses the e ort to maximize his utility in (2):
The Nash equilibrium is given by the solution to (12) and (13) . In the symmetric Nash equilibrium e i = e i = b e(b) and m i = m i = b m(b). The system of equations that de nes the symmetric equilibrium, collapses to the system of equations (5)- (7) with
B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: For a given managerial bonus b, face value r and managerial e ort e the entrepreneur chooses the monitoring intensity to maximize pro ts in (4) , that is
For a given managerial bonus b; debt rate r and monitoring intensity m; each manager chooses the e ort to maximize his utility in (2):
The Nash equilibrium is given by the couple of e orts f b m(b); b e(b)g solution to (16) and (17) . In addition investors require their expected return to be equal to 1 , that is [r S] D = D: They rationally anticipate that the equilibrium e ort is b e(b) and monitoring b m(b) for a given managerial bonus b: Substituting equilibrium e orts in the investors' rationality condition gives (7). 2
Proof of Proposition 2:
From equilibrium conditions in Proposition 1, substituting (7) into (6) gives
with b
We can compare b p(0) and b p(b) by using (18) and (19) . It follows that b
It is useful to de ne the LHS of the above disequality, after substituting (5), as a generic function of m 2 [0; 1]
The To mantain constant the leverage, i.e., the ratio between debt and total assets, it must be that
from which D 2 = 2 D 1 and ! 2 = 2! 1 . The proof requires to compare the threshold in Proposition 2 with a new threshold in the case of 2 projects. We have to distinguish between two cases, depending on whether b r(b)D 2 is above or below (R b) :
Then (14) becomes:
while in this case (15) is:
Thus (6) and (7) simplify respectively to:
Substituting (21) in (20) gives:
where while in this case (15) is
Substituting (25) in (24) gives: 
